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Negative and positive externalities in
intergroup conflict: exposure to the
opportunity to help the outgroup
reduces the inclination to harm it
Ori Weisel *
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Outgroup hate, in the context of intergroup conflict, can be expressed by harming
the outgroup, but also by denying it help. Previous work established that this
distinction—whether the externality on the outgroup is negative or positive—has an
important effect on the likelihood of outgroup hate emerging as a motivation for individual
participation in intergroup conflict. The current work uses a within-subject design to
examine the behavior of the same individuals in intergroup conflict with negative and
positive externalities on the outgroup. Each participant made two choices, one for each
type of externality, and the order was counter balanced. The main results are that (1)
behavior is fairly consistent across negative and positive externalities, i.e., the tendency
to display outgroup hate by harming the outgroup is correlated with the tendency to
display outgroup hate by avoiding to help the outgroup; (2) People are reluctant to harm
the outgroup after being exposed to the opportunity to help it; (3)Groupness—the degree
to which people care about their group and its well-being—is related to outgroup hate
only when participants encounter the opportunity to harm the outgroup first (before they
encounter the opportunity to help it). In this setting the relationship between groupness
and outgroup hate spilled over to the subsequent interaction, where it was possible to
help the outgroup. When the opportunity to help the outgroup was encountered first,
groupness was not related to outgroup hate.
Keywords: parochialism, intergroup conflict, ingroup love, outgroup hate, team games
1. INTRODUCTION
In the context of intergroup conflict, parochial altruism—the willingness to incur a personal cost in
order to favor one’s ingroup over the outgroup—can be motivated by “ingroup love” (a cooperative
preference for helping the ingroup) and/or by “outgroup hate” (an aggressive/competitive
preference for harming the outgroup, or increasing the gap between the groups; Rusch, 2014).
In many intergroup conflicts the two are not distinguishable, as individual participation in the
conflict simultaneously increases the ingroup’s welfare and decreases the outgroup’s welfare, such
that participation can be motivated by ingroup love, by outgroup hate, or by a combination of both
(Allport, 1954; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Brewer, 1999).
Outgroup hate is often thought of as a desire to actively harm the outgroup, e.g., by taking part
in hate crimes or property destruction targeted against the outgroup. In such cases, outgroup hate
is expressed by imposing negative externalities on members of the outgroup. Outgroup hate can
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also manifest itself, however, as discriminatory helping behavior.
In the latter case, outgroup hate is expressed by avoiding to help,
or, in other words, avoiding to impose positive externalities, on
members of the outgroup. In a recent paper, Weisel and Böhm
(2015) show that the relative roles of ingroup love and outgroup
hate as motivations for individual participation in intergroup
conflict crucially depend on whether outgroup hate can be
expressed by imposing negative externalities, or by avoiding to
impose positive externalities, on the outgroup.
Outgroup hate emerges as an important motivation for
individual participation in intergroup conflict when it can be
displayed by help-avoidance (avoiding to impose a positive
externality), especially when the degree of enmity between the
groups is high (Weisel and Böhm, 2015). When outgroup
hate necessarily entails harming the outgroup (i.e., imposing
a negative externality), it plays a lesser role, and ingroup
love seems to be the main motivation at play (Halevy et al.,
2008, 2012; De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010). The above
result—that outgroup hate plays a major role when it can be
expressed by help-avoidance—is in line with previous work
that finds that many instances of discrimination are driven
by ingroup favoritism (the selective preferential treatment of
ingroup members; sometimes used synonymously to ingroup
love), and not necessarily by outgroup hostility (outright outgroup
derogation; sometimes used synonymously to (outgroup hate;
Mummendey et al., 1992, 2000; Banaji and Greenwald, 2013;
Greenwald and Pettigrew, 2014).
TABLE 1 | Games, accounts, and payoffs.
Group size = 3 Effect on
Ingroup Outgroup
Game Account Self 2 3 1 2 3
IPD-MD Private +2 0 0 0 0 0
Within-group +1 +1 +1 0 0 0
Between-group +1 +1 +1 −1 −1 −1
Positive variant of the IPD-MD Private +2 0 0 0 0 0
Within-group +1 +1 +1 0 0 0
Between-group +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
Group size = 6 Effect on
Ingroup Outgroup
Game Account Self 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
IPD-MD Private +2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Within-group +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Between-group +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5
Positive variant of the IPD-MD Private +2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Within-group +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Between-group +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5
The table illustrates the effect of each token allocated to the private, within-group, or between-group accounts on the payoff of the individual making the allocation (referred to as ingroup
member “self”), the payoff of each of the two other ingroup members, and the payoff of the three outgroup members. Each individual had 10 tokens to allocate. The final payoff of each
person was determined by the combined effect of the allocations of all ingroup and outgroup members.
Weisel and Böhm (2015) had participants make decisions in
the context of three experimentally induced intergroup conflicts,
namely the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD; Bornstein
and Ben-Yossef, 1994), the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma—
Maximizing Difference game (IPD-MD; Halevy et al., 2008),
and a positive variant of the IPD-MD (introduced by Weisel
and Böhm), in a between-subjects design. The present study
employs a within-subjects design and focuses on the IPD-MD
and the positive variant of the IPD-MD. In the IPD-MD game
participants face a choice between selfish behavior, helping their
ingroup (at a personal cost), or helping their ingroup and
harming the outgroup (at the same personal cost; see Table 1). In
the positive variant of the IPD-MD the choice is between selfish
behavior, helping the ingroup (at a personal cost), or helping the
ingroup and helping the outgroup as well (at the same cost; see
Table 1).
The logic underlying the analysis in Weisel and Böhm (2015)
is that the IPD-MD and the positive variant of the IPD-MD are
useful tools for investigating ingroup love and outgroup hate
because the decisions made in the context of these games make
the two key motivations—ingroup love and outgroup hate—
distinguishable from each other. As stated above, helping the
ingroup in the IPD-MD can be achieved either with or without
harming the outgroup. As a result, choosing to help the ingroup
while harming the outgroup was interpreted by Weisel and
Böhm (2015) as a display of outgroup hate, and choosing to
help the ingroup without harming the outgroup was interpreted
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as a display of ingroup love (an interpretation shared by, e.g.,
Halevy et al., 2008, 2012; De Dreu et al., 2010). In a similar vein,
helping the ingroup in the positive variant of the IPD-MD can be
achieved either with or without helping the outgroup. Crucially
to the analysis in Weisel and Böhm, choosing to help the ingroup
without helping the outgroup was interpreted as a display of
outgroup hate, and choosing to help the ingroup and helping the
outgroup as well was interpreted as a display of ingroup love1.
An initial goal of the present study is to examine whether
choices in the IPD-MD and in the positive variant of the
IPD-MD indeed have comparable motivational underpinnings.
Weisel and Böhm interpret (1) harming the outgroup in the IPD-
MD, and avoiding to help the outgroup in the positive variant
of the IPD-MD, as manifestations of outgroup hate; and (2)
avoiding to harm the outgroup in the IPD-MD, and helping the
ingroup and the outgroup in the positive variant of the IPD-
MD, as manifestations of ingroup love. To the degree that these
interpretations are reasonable, people who choose to help the
ingroup and harm the outgroup in the IPD-MD should also show
a preference for helping the ingroup and avoiding to help the
outgroup in the positive variant, as both of these actions are,
supposedly, displays of outgroup hate; and people who choose to
help the ingroup without harming the outgroup in the IPD-MD
should also show a preference for helping the ingroup and the
outgroup in the positive variant, as both actions are, supposedly,
related to ingroup love.
An additional question that the current study addresses is
that of order effects. Does the order in which people encounter
situations in which they can display outgroup hate by imposing
negative externalities on the outgroup, and situations in which
they can display outgroup hate by avoiding to impose positive
externalities on the outgroup, affect behavior? Past work suggests,
albeit indirectly, that exposure to the possibility of harming
the outgroup might lead to more negative attitudes toward it
(i.e., more outgroup hate) in future interactions, and that the
possibility to help the outgroup might lead to more positive
attitudes toward it in the future. This prediction is derived from
work showing that perceptions of the outgroup (in particular
dehumanization and rehumanization) are affected by awareness
of harm or help that members of the ingroup imposed on the
outgroup in the past (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cˇehajic´
et al., 2009; Saguy et al., 2015). The present design allows to
examine whether exposure to the opportunity to harm or to
help the outgroup, and the understanding that other ingroup
member have the same opportunity, has a similar effect on
future behavior. The results can have implications on the way
repeated interactions between groups are structured, as well as
methodological implications for research using the IPD-MD and
related paradigms.
Finally, the study addresses the relation between peoples’
sense of groupness—defined as the degree to which they care
about their group and its well-being—and their willingness to
display outgroup hate by imposing negative externalities, and/or
1Helping the ingroup and the outgroup might be considered as a display of
outgroup love. Recall, however, that the two main motivations under consideration
are ingroup love and outgroup hate.
by avoiding to impose positive externalities, on the outgroup.
As groupness is measured by items that concern the ingroup
only (see Section 2.3.1), a straight forward prediction is that it
is related to the overall willingness to contribute to the ingroup,
regardless of the effect on the outgroup. The respective relations
between groupness and ingroup love and outgroup hate are less
obvious to predict. Would groupness be related to ingroup love,
to outgroup hate, or to both? Results from studies investigating
the hormone oxytocin, known for increasing peoples’ affinity to
their group (i.e., their groupness), suggest that it is associated
mainly with ingroup love, as opposed to outgroup hate (De Dreu
et al., 2010; De Dreu, 2012).
The groupness measure that is introduced here can be seen as
a type of social value orientation (SVO) measure that is targeted
at one’s ingroup. Typically, SVO is conceptualized as concerning
an unidentified other, not necessarily a member of the in-group
(see Section 2.3.3). The groupness measure used here (Section
2.3.1) explicitly focuses on the well-being of the ingroup. Despite
this difference, it would hardly be surprising if the two measures
turn out to be very related to each other; indeed, recent work
suggests that pro-social tendencies are often ingroup-bounded
(De Dreu et al., 2014, 2015). Although both groupness and SVO
are measured in the current experiment, the main interest here
is the possible relation of groupness—a concern for the well-
being of one’s ingroup—to displays of outgroup hate vis-à-vis an
outgroup.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Participants
One hundred forty-four undergraduate students (74 females,
Mage = 25) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem participated
in the experiment, which was approved by the psychology
department’s ethics committee. Participants were recruited
by campus advertisements promising monetary rewards for
participation in a decision-making task.
2.2. Experimental Procedure
Sessions were held with cohorts of twelve participants. Upon
arrival each participant was seated in a separate cubicle, and given
printed instructions and decision forms (see Supplementary
Material).
2.3. Design
The independent variables were the game (IPD-MD vs. positive
variant of the IPD-MD; within-subjects) and the size of the
interacting groups (three vs. six; between-subjects). The order
of the two games was counter-balanced across sessions. The
two orders of the game and the two group sizes were perfectly
balanced, resulting in 36 participants in each cell. The group size
did not affect the results in any meaningful way, so this variable
was dropped from the analysis, and the observations were pooled,
resulting in 72 participants in each order of the games.
The twelve participants in each session were randomly divided
into groups of size three or six. Each group was matched with
another group. Groups were named, and graphically represented
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on the instructions, as the circles group, the triangles group, the
diamonds group, and the squares groups (when the group size
equalled six, there were only two groups: circles and triangles).
Participants were informed that they will be required to make
decisions in two world states, color coded as the yellow and
green world states; that at the end of the experiment one of the
two world states will be chosen by a public coin toss; and that
decisions made in the chosen state will determine the payoffs
of all participants. No feedback was given between decisions in
the two world states. To increase the saliency of the distinction
between the two world states, the instructions that explained
the yellow world state were printed on yellow paper, as were
the corresponding decision forms. Likewise, the instructions that
explained the green world state, and the corresponding decision
forms, were printed on green paper.
In both the green and the yellow world states each participant
was endowed with ten tokens, and had to allocate them between
a private account, a within-group account, and a between-group
account. Participants decided on one allocation of tokens in each
world state. In the green state they played the IPD-MD game,
and in the yellow state the positive variant of the IPD-MD game.
The payoffs associated with each account in each of these games,
and for each of the two group sizes, are displayed in Table 1
(see Supplementary Material for the instructions participants
received, and for formal payoff functions).
It is apparent from Table 1 (see also the payoff functions
in the Supplementary Material) that in both the IPD-MD and
the positive variant, regardless of group size, payoff maximizing
players should invest all of their tokens in the private account,
which generates a profit of 2 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) for the
decision maker. Investing in the other accounts generates only
1 (group size = 3) or 0.5 (group size = 6) NIS. This is the case
regardless of the actions of the other ingroup and/or outgroup
members. Since no feedback was provided between the two
games, they can be thought of as two separate one-shot games,
and the Nash equilibrium is to invest all of the tokens in the
private account in both the IPD-MD and the positive variant.
In the IPD-MD negative payoffs are possible. The worst-case
scenario for a given individual is to allocate all of her tokens to
the within- or between-group account, which generates a profit
of either 10 NIS (group size = 3) or 5 NIS (group size = 6) for
herself, while her group members keep all of their tokens in their
private account, which does not affect the individual’s payoff, and
all outgroup members allocate all of their tokens to the between-
group account, which leads to a loss of 30 NIS for the individual.
In this case the individual’s payoff is−20 or−25 NIS (depending
on the group size). To avoid negative payoffs, an initial amount
of 40 NIS was added to each participant’s total payoff in the IPD-
MD, ensuring a minimum payoff of 20 or 15 NIS. In the positive
variant of the IPD-MD an initial amount of 10 NIS was added to
each participant, such that the minimum payoff is 20 or 15 NIS
as well.
A post experimental questionnaire tapped participants’ sense
of “groupness,” i.e., the degree to which they cared for and
identified with their group; their social value orientation; as well
as beliefs about the allocations of ingroup and outgroupmembers
(the latter are not reported in the current work).
2.3.1. Groupness
The following four items, rated on a 1 (“do not agree at
all”) to 7 (“totally agree”) scale, captured participants’ sense of
groupness:
1. It is important to me to contribute to the group.
2. I am committed to contribute to the group.
3. It is important to me to act in favor of the group.
4. I want the group to do well.
2.3.2. Beliefs
Participants were asked to best estimate the average number of
tokens that the other members in their group and in the other
group chose to keep and to invest in each account in both the
green (IPD-MD) and yellow (positive variant) world states.
2.3.3. Social Value Orientation
Participants’ social value orientation (SVO)—the way they
balance between their own and others’ welfare—was assessed
with the social value orientation decomposed game measure
(Van Lange, 1999). The measure is based on nine items. In each
item participants choose one of three allocations of resources
between themselves and an anonymous other person. One
of the three allocations indicates a pro-social preference to
maximize the joint outcome of self and other, another indicates
an individualistic preference to maximize the outcome of self,
and the third indicates a competitive preference to maximize the
gap between self and other. An example is the choice between
500 points to self and 100 to other (the competitive option), 500
points to self and 500 points to other (the pro-social option), or
550 points to self and 350 to other (the individualistic option).
Participants whomake at least six choices that are consistent with
one of the three types are classified as that type (e.g., a participant
who makes six (or more) pro-social choices is classified as pro-
social).
3. RESULTS
3.1. Consistency between IPD-MD and the
Positive Variant of the IPD-MD
Are the motivations associated with contribution to the within-
group and between-group accounts in the IPD-MD—ingroup
love and outgroup hate, respectively—indeed a mirror image of
the motivations in the positive variant of the IPD-MD? In other
words, are people who contribute to the within-group (between-
group) account in the IPD-MD more likely to contribute to the
between-group (within-group) account in the positive variant?
According to Weisel and Böhm (2015), this should indeed be the
case.
Table 2 presents correlations between the number of tokens
each participant allocated to the within- and between-group
accounts in the IPD-MD and the positive variant of the IPD-
MD. Regardless of which game was played first, the correlation
between allocations to the within-group account in the IPD-MD
and the between-group account in the positive variant (r =
0.64, r = 0.45) was medium-high and significantly different
from zero. The same holds true for the correlation between
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TABLE 2 | Correlations between contribution decisions in the first and second games.
2nd game
IPD-MD Positive variant of the IPD-MD
Within-group Between-group Within-group Between-group
1st game
IPD-MD
Within-group − − −0.15 0.64***
Between-group − − 0.48*** −0.11
Positive variant of the IPD-MD
Within-group −0.10 0.72*** − −
Between-group 0.45*** −0.01 − −
***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | Allocations to ingroup love and outgroup hate in the IPD-MD and Positive IPD-MD. (B,C) Are restricted to either pro-social or individualistic
participants, respectively. Each pair of bars refers to conditions where the respective game was played first (left) or second (right). Ingroup love stands for the
within-group account in the IPD-MD and for the between-group account in the positive variant of the IPD-MD; outgroup hate stands for the between-group account in
the IPD-MD, and for the within-group account in the positive variant. *p < 0.05; Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. (A) All participants (n = 144). (B) Pro-Social (n = 79). (C)
Individualistic (n = 55).
the between-group account in the IPD-MD and the within-
group account in the positive variant (r = 0.48, r = 0.72). In
contrast, correlations between the within-group accounts (r =
−0.15, r = −0.10), and between the between-group accounts
(r = −0.11, r = −0.01), are low and not significantly different
from zero. This pattern of results confirms that the motivations
underlying contribution to the within-group and between-group
accounts in the IPD-MD (ingroup love and outgroup hate,
respectively) are indeed a mirror image of the motivations in the
positive variant of the IPD-MD, as argued in Weisel and Böhm
(2015).
3.2. Order Effects
Does behavior in a given game depend onwhether it is played first
or second? Figure 1A shows the average contributions toward
ingroup love and outgroup hate, for each game and for each
position the game was played (first or second). As can be seen
in the figure, the order makes a difference only for the IPD-MD,
but not for the positive variant of the IPD-MD. In the IPD-MD
there was more outgroup hate, and less ingroup love, when it
was played first, as compared to when it was played second (i.e.,
after the positive variant; Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: ingroup love,
p = 0.029; outgroup hate, p = 0.002). In the positive variant
of the IPD-MD allocations to both ingroup love and outgroup
hate remained similar, regardless of whether it was played first
or after the IPD-MD (ingroup love, p = 0.135; outgroup hate,
p = 0.996).
A plausible way to interpret this finding is that the positive
variant of the IPD-MD has a spillover effect on behavior in the
IPD-MD, but not vice-versa. After having the option to help
the outgroup in the positive variant of the IPD-MD, very few
group members find it appropriate to harm the outgroup in a
subsequent IPD-MD. The opposite is not true: having the option
to harm the outgroup in the IPD-MD does not affect behavior in
the positive variant that follows.
3.3. Social Value Orientation
Of the 144 participants that took part in the study, 79 (55%)
were classified as pro-social, 55 (38%) as individualistic, 1 (1%)
as competitive, and 9 (6%) were unclassified (see Table 3).
Figures 1B,C show the average contributions toward ingroup
love and outgroup hate for pro-social and individualistic
participants, respectively. The figures show that the order
effects reported in the previous section are driven by pro-social
participants, while behavior of individualistic participants did not
follow the same pattern.
Previous work links pro-sociality to increased discriminatory
behavior (in favor of the ingroup) in intergroup setting
(Aaldering et al., 2013). In the present study, discriminatory
behavior is manifested in the clearest way by contributions to the
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TABLE 3 | Distribution of participants accross SVO and groupness levels.
Groupness level
SVO High Low =Median Total
Pro social 49 29 1 79
Individualistic 16 35 4 55
Competitive 0 1 0 1
Unclassified 3 5 1 9
Total 68 70 6 144
SVO was determined according to the SVO decomposed game measure. The High and
Low groupness levels were determined according to a median split of the groupness
scores.
within-group account in the positive variant of the IPD-MD (i.e.,
outgroup hate). These choices are clearly discriminatory, since
the same outcome for the ingroup can be achieved by investing in
the non-discriminatory between-group account, which benefits
the outgroup as well2. Pro-socials indeed invested more than
individualistic participants in the discriminatory within-group
account in the positive variant (Pro-social: n = 79, M = 1.11,
SD = 1.47; Individualistic: n = 55, M = 0.71, SD = 1.30;
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: p = 0.054).
Social value orientation was highly related to the groupness
measure. Pro-socials were clearly higher on groupness (M =
4.78, SD = 1.38) than individualistic participants [M = 3.49,
SD = 1.61; t(132) = 4.96, p < 0.001]. Despite this strong
relation between SVO and groupness, the groupness score of
a considerable number of participants is not in line with their
SVO type. The groupness score of thirty-seven percent of the
pro-social participants was below the median, and the groupness
score of 29% of the individualistic participants was above the
median (see Table 3), suggesting that while SVO and groupness
are strongly related, they do not fully overlap.
3.4. Effect of Groupness
The effect of groupness on contribution decisions was tested
by means of generalized linear mixed effect models, using the
lme4 package (Bates et al., 2012) in the R environment (R Core
Team, 2012). Since each participant made two decisions, the
specific participant was modeled as a random effect (Pinheiro
and Bates, 2000). The explanatory variables were groupness,
the game [dummy variable; IPD-MD (baseline) or positive
variant of the IPD-MD], the position of the game [dummy
variable; first (baseline) or second], and the two- and three-way
interactions between these variables. The dependant variables
were (in separate models) the number of tokens invested in the
private account, the number of tokens invested toward ingroup
love (within-group account in IPD-MD, between-group account
in positive variant), and the number of tokens invested toward
outgroup hate (between-group account in IPD-MD, within-
group account in positive variant).
Table 4 presents the results of three regression models,
predicting the number of tokens invested in the private account,
2In the IPD-MD both the within-group account and the between-group account
are discriminatory (albeit not to the same degree).
invested toward ingroup love, and invested toward outgroup
hate, as a function of the participants reported level of groupness,
the game, and the position of the game (first or second). To
facilitate interpretation, the table reports the intercept and slope
for the groupness variable for each combination of game and
position, rather than the effect of each variable relative to a
baseline. Accordingly, the significance indicators in Table 4 refer
to comparisons of the intercepts and slopes to zero, rather than to
an (arbitrary) baseline (see Supplementary Material for another
presentation of these results).
In both the IPD-MD and the positive variant of the IPD-MD,
regardless of the order in which the games were played, groupness
was negatively related to the number of tokens invested in the
private account (i.e., groupness had a positive effect on overall
contributions). When the IPD-MD was played first, groupness
was positively related to both ingroup love and outgroup hate.
In contrast, when the positive variant of the IPD-MD was played
first, groupness was related—in both the initial positive variant
and the subsequent IPD-MD—only to ingroup love, and not to
outgroup hate.
4. DISCUSSION
Previous research already established that when outgroup hate
can be expressed by avoiding to help the outgroup and its
members, discrimination is more likely to occur (Mummendey
et al., 1992, 2000; Banaji and Greenwald, 2013; Greenwald and
Pettigrew, 2014), and outgroup hate plays a more central role in
the unfolding of intergroup conflict (Weisel and Böhm, 2015).
The current works sheds further light on the interplay between
ingroup love and outgroup hate by examining behavior of the
same participants when outgroup hate can be displayed by
harming the outgroup (IPD-MD) and by avoiding to help it
(positive variant of the IPD-MD).
The analysis and interpretation in Weisel and Böhm
(2015) assumed that the motivations in the IPD-MD and
the positive variant of the IPD-MD are comparable, in the
sense that contribution to the within-group account in each
is motivationally similar to contribution to the between-group
account in the other (and vice-versa). The results from the
current study confirm this assumption (see Section 3.1).
More interesting, perhaps, are the different behavioral
patterns between the IPD-MD and the positive variant of
the IPD-MD. Behavior in the positive variant was rather
stable; it did not depend on whether decisions were made
before or after taking part in the IPD-MD. Behavior in the
IPD-MD, however, was sensitive to the order. Interestingly,
when the IPD-MD was played after a preceding positive
variant, there was a very low level of outgroup hate (see
Section 3.2). A possible explanation for this result is that
the first situation (game) that people encounter establishes
a set of available actions. In the positive variant of the
IPD-MD this set of actions includes helping the ingroup
only, or helping both the ingroup and outgroup, with
outgroup hate being associated with the former. This
association between outgroup hate and helping just the
ingroup carries on to the subsequent IPD-MD, where
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TABLE 4 | Generalized linear mixed effects model.
Game Position Private account Ingroup love Outgroup hate
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope
IPD-MD Fisrt 11.21*** −1.19*** −0.83 0.76*** −0.38 0.43**
Positive variant of the IPD-MD Second 10.51*** −1.11*** −0.53 0.87*** 0.02 0.24†
Positive variant of the IPD-MD First 11.04*** −1.30*** −1.29 1.13*** 0.25 0.17
IPD-MD Second 11.35*** −1.17*** −1.50† 1.09*** 0.14 0.08
The number of tokens invested the private account, ingroup love, and outgroup hate (in separate models), as a function of groupness, the game (dummy variable with two levels:
IPD-MD or the positive variant), whether the game was played first or second (dummy variable with two levels), and the interactions between these three variables. The intercept and
slope of groupness for each level of the dummy variables are compared to zero.
†p < 0.1, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
helping just the ingroup is also an available action, such
that even people with an initial inclination for outgroup hate
opt for it.
This line of reasoning also accounts for the lack of a similar
spillover effect when the IPD-MD was played first. In this case
outgroup hate is initially associated with helping the ingroup
and at the same time harming the outgroup. This combination,
however, is not available in the subsequent positive variant,
forcing participants tomake a “fresh” choice. The result is that the
level of outgroup hate is not affected by the preceding IPD-MD.
The order effect discussed above is not limited to displays of
outgroup hate, but extends to the way peoples’ sense of groupness
relates to outgroup hate. When the IPD-MD was played first, i.e.,
when the first set of available actions participants were exposed
to involved the possibility to harm the outgroup, groupness was
related to ingroup love as well as to outgroup hate in both the
initial IPD-MD and the subsequent positive variant of the IPD-
MD (see Section 3.4). Strikingly, when the positive variant was
played first, groupness was still related to ingroup love, but—in
both the initial positive variant and the subsequent IPD-MD—
not to outgroup hate. The negative effects of groupness can be
avoided, it seems, if “positive” encounters take place first.
A straight forward implication of these results is that it is
important that initial encounters betweenmembers of potentially
conflicting groups take place in a positive context (e.g., student
exchanges), where group members can have the option to
help members of the other group, even if the future holds
inevitable encounters in a negative context. In a similar vein,
before deciding whether or not to join the army, perhaps it
is better that young adults make a conscious decision about
whether or not to volunteer for the red-cross, or for a similar
organization that provides indiscriminate help. This can reduce
conflict in subsequent encounters, even those where it is possible
to harm the outgroup, and help harness group members’ sense of
groupness to constructive causes.
The reasoning above resonates well with research showing
that awareness of harm imposed on an outgroup by members
of the ingroup can increase the dehumanization of outgroup
members (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cˇehajic´ et al., 2009),
and that awareness of intergroup help can help rehumanize
the outgroup (Saguy et al., 2015). The current results suggest
that rather than awareness of actual intergroup harm or help
that occurred in the past, negative and positive impressions
of the outgroup, accompanied by the relevant motivational
forces (outgroup hate/ingroup love), can arise by being in a
situation where there is an opportunity to harm or to help the
outgroup, even in the absence of information about the actual
harming/helping behavior of other ingroup members.
Given the relatively low levels of outgroup hate they observed
in the IPD-MD game, Halevy et al. (2008) assert that “intergroup
conflicts can be resolved by channelling groupmembers’ altruism
toward internal group causes” (p. 410). The current results
suggest that if initial encounters between groups involve the
opportunity to help the outgroup, or, possibly, if the encounters
are framed such that the choice is between helping the
outgroup or not, intergroup conflict can be reduced even further.
Intergroup conflicts that involve the opportunity to harm or to
help the outgroup not only evoke different motivations (e.g.,
Weisel and Böhm, 2015), but affect each other in different ways
when they take place in succession.
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